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1. Introduction 
Since the end of last century labour migration has become a maj'or feature of societies in Southern 
Africa. Much attention has been paid to the labour migration from the so called 'BLS countries' 
(Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) to South Africa (see, for example, Elkan 1978, Kowet 1978, De 
Vletter 1985, Whiteside 1992). The single most important feature of this labour migration is that it 
is circular (Elkan 1978:145) and purely temporary, hardly ever for more than two years. After that 
migrants return home, though the likelihood is that in the course of their lives they will tnigrate 
several times. Reasons for this circular - or oscillating - migration are that the South African 
Government does in fact not permit migrants to stay longer than two years and accommodation is 
only provided for the worker alone. The migrant's family has to stay behind in the country of 
origin. Moreover, even if the South African Government would allow long-term permits and 
families to come with the migrant, it is the question whether the whole family would migrate. 
Living on communal lands, families have free accommodation and part of the total family income 
is provided by produce of the farm, being either food for own consumption or cash crops. As the 
system of communal land tenure does not permit sale of land, farms cannot be sold and if sale was 
allowed families would not do so, because due to the absence of borrowing facilities the price 
received for the farm would lay far below its expected future stream of income (Elkan 1978:146-7). 
Although labour migration to South Africa is a less pronounced feature of Swazi society than, for 
instance, in Lesotho (see Murray 1978 and 1981), its impact on all levels of Swazi society cannot be 
denied. A number of publications appeared on this subject (Booth 1986 and 1988, Daniel 1982, 
Fransman 1982, Kowet 1978, Levin 1985, Low 1986, Neocosmos 1987, Rosen-Prinz and Prinz 1978, 
Russell 1984 and 1988, De Vletter 1982, 1983). Most of these studies deal with migrant labour at a 
macro-level and analyze nation-wide figures of labour migration, investigate its causes and discuss 
its economie, social and political implications. This paper wants to give a contribution to the 
discussion on what migrant labour does to the Swazi homestead. It is analyzed in what respects 
migrant labour might affect the homestead as a solidarity group providing social security to its 
members. Section 2 gives a brief introduction to the conditions which makes a group a solidarity 
group and how these apply to the Swazi homestead. In the Sections 3 till 6 an attempt is made to 
assess the influence of migrant labour on the characteristic features of a solidarity group by 
comparing a group of homesteads with migrant labourers in South Africa and a group of 
homesteads without them. Data are derived from a 1990 survey among 195 homesteads. From this 
survey 83 cases are used for this paper. 
A few qualifications have to made before starting the discussion. Firstly, it is the homestead as a 
solidarity group which is the focus of the discussion. No attention is paid to the migrant him- or 
herself. In other words, the focus is on those who are left behind on the homestead. Secondly, the 
This paper is based on a research paper presented at the seminar "Social Security, Law and 
Socio-Economic Change", held at the Department of Social Sciences, Faculty of Law, Erasmus 
University of Rotterdam, 6 October 1992. I thank Hans Linnemann for useful suggestions and 
comments. 
2 
study is restricted to homesteads situated on communal land in the rural areas, so-called Swazi 
Nation Land (SNL).2 Thirdly, the analysis only includes those homesteads which have migrant 
labourers in South Africa and those who have no wage labourers at all. A substantial part of Swazi 
homesteads (39.4 percent in the sample) has one or more members doing wage-labour in 
Swaziland. These members are either resident or are absent during the week but return in the 
weekends. The latter are also migrants, but can be denoted as so called "commuters". This form of 
migration differs strongly from the migration to South Africa whereby migrants return once a year 
and is therefore excluded from the analysis. In addition 17.6 percent of the homesteads in the 
survey have members working in Swaziland as well as members working in South Africa. Also this 
group of homesteads is excluded from the analysis in order to make the differences between 
homesteads without and with migrant labour in South Africa more clear. This means that the 
sample analyzed in this paper contains 83 homesteads of which 37 homesteads have migrant 
labourers in South Africa and 46 homesteads have not. Although the number of observations is not 
large, it is thought large enough to indicate some main tendencies and differences. The fourth and 
last qualification is that the survey of 1990 was not meant to find explicit data on the specific 
questions addressed in this paper. Not all propositions in this paper can be sustained by data from 
this survey, and findings from other sources are used where necessary. 
2. The Homestead as Solidarity Group 
The homestead as basic social and economie unit in Swaziland has been widely discussed by social 
scientists (see, among others, Allen 1973, Holleman 1964, Hughes 1972, Kuper 1947 and 1963, 
Marwick 1966, Neocosmos 1987, Ngubane 1983, Russell 1983, Sibisi 1979, De Vletter 1983). What 
exactly is a homestead? Hughes (1972:69) indicates that sometimes the term homestead refers to a 
physical entity (huts, cattle byre and arable lands), and sometimes it refers to a specific social 
group. To avoid confusion I adhere to the common practice of most social scientists in Swaziland 
to indicate with the homestead the social group. 
The term "homestead" is a translation of the siSwati word "umuti", indicating a family group living 
in a small family settlement. It is a family group whose members live together in consequence of 
being close kin (Ngubane 1983:95). In this sense the umuti differs from the village, where also most 
or even all of its members may be related, but without an inherent connection between kinship and 
proximity. Whereas a village has a resident headman or some other form of authority recognized 
as responsible for the af fairs of the village as such, the head of the Swazi type of family settlement 
is simply the head of the family group. Since his position depends on how he is related to the other 
Swazi Nation Land covers two-thirds of the total land surface in Swaziland. Part of Swazi 
Nation Land is divided into some 172 chiefdoms, each headed by a chief. The chief takes charge of 
the distribution of this communal land among homesteads in his chiefdom in name of the King. 
Another part of Swazi Nation Land falls under direct jurisdiction of the King and belongs to him 
and the royal family. The remaining one-third of the land is privately owned, and is either given in 
concession by the Swazi state to forestry and sugar companies, their plantations covering almost 
one-fourth of the country, or belongs to individual tenants in which case land is called Individual 
Tenure Land or Title Deed Land. 
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members, and not primarily on where he lives, he remains the head of the group even during a 
prolonged absence (Ngubane 1983:95). "Homestead" is not entirely satisfactory as translation of 
umuti, but it serves to highlight that it is neither a viilage nor simply a household; it may well 
contain several households. These households (tindlu, sing. indlu) may centre around the head-
man's wife or wives and their (unmarried) children, and/or around married brothers or sons with 
their wives and children. The woman in the household has her own kitchen and sleeping huts, and 
her own fields and cattle allotted for the use of her household. By dint of her own industry and 
some assistance from her husband she produces crops (mainly maize) from the fields to provide 
food for the unit. Each household has its own food store. However, some of the land allocated to 
the homestead is not distributed to the tindlu, but worked upon together by all homestead 
members. This land is called "grandmother's field" and its fruits accrue to the homestead head. He 
may keep the produce for himself, but more likely he will keep it in store and redistribute it among 
those households of which the supplies are inadequate to meet its needs. Whatever a woman earns 
by bartering some of her produce accrues to her own household. The same holds for the husband, 
although some of his earnings may accrue to the homestead as a whole in the form of food, 
agricultural inputs and utensils. Within homesteads, then, households can be seen as units of 
consumption and partly also as units of production. Nowadays, however, multi-household 
homesteads are less and less the rule, and the latest population census (Central Statistical Office 
1986) found that only 16.5 percent of the homesteads on SNL contained two or more households. 
In my survey I found 14.4 percent of the homesteads to have two or more households. 
It can safely be stated that the homestead is the basic unit of Swazi society, and as such it has 
several functions in Swazi society. These functions can be labelled as economie, educational, 
ceremonial and legal (Marwick 1966:43). Customarily, one of its functions also is to provide social 
protection for the individual member against economie or social shortfalls. As Ngubane states 
(1983:103): "..., a Swazi is also entitled to assistance and protection from his umuti (underlining 
Ngubane) in time of need, as when he is ill or infirm, disabled or too old to fend for himself, or 
else afflicted with misfortune. In short, it provides him with a comprehensive security he can 
scarcely find in any alternative institution or body." As in many other societies, in Swaziland social 
protection is internalised within the domestic unit of production and consumption (see Zacher 
1988, Freiburg-Strauss and Jung 1988), i.e., the homestead. Although many studies on the 
homestead (Kuper 1947 and 1963, Marwick 1966, Ngubane 1983, Russell 1983 and 1984) emphasize 
its "social security role" and the entitlement of the homestead members to this social security, the 
important question remains whether or not the homestead as a social group is actually able to 
meet the demands that come from within the homestead. As Partsch (1983:62-8) noted, several 
economie and social conditions have to be fulfilled before a social group can also act as a solidarity 
group, i.e., a group in which means are distributed from productive members to members who are 
not able to provide themselves with means. Let me review these conditions and apply them to the 
homestead. 
The term "means" sounds vague, but by using this term I indicate that not only goods 
(commodities), but also money and labour (services) are included in the set of items that may be 
redistributed. 
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First of all, in order to redistribute means, sufficiënt means have to be produced and become 
available within the homestead as a whole. In general this means that each productive homestead 
member should produce more than necessary for his or her own minimum Standard of living. A 
minimum Standard of living can be defined in terms of capabilities, i.e., the abilities of an 
individual to achieve minimum levels of certain basic functionings (such as being adequately 
nourished, minimally sheltered, and so on) (see Sen 1985, Drèze and Sen 1991). In developing 
countries, and also in Swaziland, the majority of people live in poverty or deprivation which is the 
failure to have the ability to achieve minimum levels of certain basic functionings. Given this 
general phenomenon of poverty one could easily conclude that within the homestead no one is able 
to reach a certain minimum Standard of living that, consequently, social protection does not work. 
But, as Freiburg-Strauss and Jung (1988:231) conclude, deprivation does not lead to an abrupt 
disruption of social security. Deprivation generally results from a gradual worsening of conditions 
under which homestead production takes place, and its consequences for the homestead as 
solidarity group will therefore also become gradually clear. Studies on economie differentiation 
among homesteads (De Vletter 1983, Neocosmos 1987, Income and Expenditure Survey 1985) 
make clear that the conditions are not the same for all homesteads; homesteads differ considerably 
in their capacity to raise means, so that the Standard of living of homesteads differs accordingly. It 
is noted, then, that also the capacity of homesteads to function as solidarity group will, among 
other things, vary with its economie position. In Section 6 of this paper I return to this discussion. 
A second condition for the solidarity group is that the ratio non-productive members / productive 
members cannot be too high, in order to prevent a unacceptable burden on the productive 
members of the group. Although an acceptable upper bound to this so-called dependency ratio 
cannot be given, an increasing number of non-productive members would either lead to all 
homestead members having less than sufficiënt means when the remaining productive homestead 
members keep sharing their produce with the non-productive, or it would lead to lower and lower 
means available for the non-productive members when productive members want to sustain their 
own Standard of living. Whether or not this ratio is too high for a homestead cannot be said a 
priori as the ratio differs through the development cycle of the homestead. Low (1986) distin-
guished five stages in the "life-cycle" of the homestead whereby the homestead develops from small 
to large to small again: establishment, expansion, consolidation, decline and fission. Each stage 
corresponds with different sizes and dependency ratios, which are highest and lowest respectively in 
the consolidation stage. At the same time Low found strong correlations between the stage of 
development and economie performance of the homestead. In further sections I use this classifica-
tion to distinguish among the 86 homesteads. For the way in which homesteads are classified I 
refer to Appendix A. 
The two conditions mentioned above can be denoted as primarily economie conditions for a 
solidarity group. Social conditions are equally important. Sufficiënt means available and a relatively 
favourable dependency ratio do as such not guarantee that the social group also functions as a 
solidarity group. For a social group to be a solidarity group its size, composition, stability over time 
and redistribution principle(s) are also of utmost importance. 
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The size of the group is important because it determines on how many members the burden falls 
to take care of the unproductive members in the group. The larger the size the less the burden for 
each productive member. Partsch (1983:65) suggests that a group, therefore, should be larger than 
the nuclear family to discuss in a sensible way social protection within family groups. Homestead 
sizes do vary widely depending on both the stage of the development cycle and the extent to which 
they contain one or more households. In my sample of 195 homesteads the average homestead size 
was 10.1 persons, but behind this average a variation could be found from 1 till 30 persons 
constituting the homestead. 83.9 percent of the sample homesteads had a size over 5 persons and 
45.0 percent had 11 members or more. Just a minority of the sample homesteads (10.2 percent) 
could be labelled as a nuclear family group (see also Section 4). 
The composition of the group must be such that at any point in time sufficiënt members are there 
to transfer means to the unproductive group members. In other words, the composition should be 
such that not all members face the same risks and do not lose their productive power or produc-
tion at the same time. Following Platteau (1991:139) one could say that the relative absence of 
covariate risks makes a group better suited to function as solidarity group. Several features of the 
social group constituting the homestead do meet this condition. First of all homesteads contain 
several generations; in 60 percent of the sample cases, homesteads contained three generations or 
more. Social contingencies like old age and age-bound diseases are not likely to happen then 
among all members at the same time. Besides, both sexes are present on the homestead. Because 
of a strict gender division of labour by which women work in domestic activities and subsistence 
agriculture and men are engaged in wage labour or other income generating activities, the presence 
of both sexes guarantees a spread of different productive activities over different homestead 
members. When the production of one or a few members falls short because of economie or social 
contingencies, not all production is lost. To some extent, then, the homestead is always able to 
raise means when one of its members fall short. However, to the extent that homestead members 
have common risks, like the risk to be infected by diseases or natural disasters, or are engaged in 
the same type of productive activities the homestead will be less able to cope with the conse-
quences and social protection will have to come from outside the homestead. 
The durability and stability in time of the group is the third social condition. For all members it 
must be certain that the group will continue to exist when contingencies occur and during the 
whole period in which consequences are feit as result of the contingency. Therefore, especially 
social groups that are able to replace departing members over time are suitable as solidarity 
groups. Extended families or clans are perfect solidarity groups from this point of view. Although it 
would be too opportunistic to suggest that the homestead is an extended family in its strict sense, 
its continuing existence is certain to its members. Because the relations between homestead 
members are based on kinship ties, the individual becomes member of the a kingroup when he or 
she is born and will stay member till his or her death. In this way the homestead is far better 
suited as solidarity group than groups based on neighbourhood, friendship or contract. In contrast 
to the latter forms, kinship exists relatively independent from the will of the individual and will 
survive the particular life time of an individual. Furthermore, Partsch (1983:100-1) states that this 
condition is best fulfilled through kin groups of which the existence is not threatened when one of 
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the members falls out. In two-generation families the marriage of the children or the death of the 
parents will finish the existence of the group. In three-generation families this problem does not 
occur. Through birth and marriage new members are included and the presence of three 
generations ensures a relatively easy care for children and elderly. 
A final social condition for a group to be a solidanty group is that a principle must be present that 
obliges members to support other members when necessary. There must be norms or values that 
force members to redistribute means from those who have to those who have not. The existence of 
such a "normative insurance" (Partsch 1983:67) is a prerequisite because it ensures that individual 
members will contribute and will contribute sufficiently at times that this is needed. Customary 
rules, moral principles and community norms constitute, therefore, a powerful means of assuring 
each group member that cooperation will ensue and the obligation created will be enforced 
(Platteau 1991:139). Also within the homestead such moral principles exist. Ngubane (1983:104) 
says on this point: "it is the umuti (underlining Ngubane) which has fust claim on a member, for its 
support of its members and especially those of his own house (indlu, A.L.) as well as generally for 
the maintenance of the physical structure, its land and its livestock, as his or her circumstances 
permit and his or her age, sex and marital status dictate more specifically. Even if only by sending 
money, or bringing goods when he or she can, he or she should make his or her contribution". In 
sum, homestead membership implies also having economie obligations and rights towards other 
homestead members. These obligations and rights are, however, highly dependent on sex, age, 
marital status and someone's social position in the homestead. 
As said the gender division of labour forces women into domestic and (subsistence) agricultural 
activities. This results in a restricted access to monetary earnings of female homestead members 
and therefore women made traditionally their economie contributions to the homestead directly in 
labour (Russell 1984:19). More specific to the role of women in the homestead as solidarity group 
their contribution is derived from the gender division of labour: as domestic activities also include 
daily care of the children, the elderly, sick, disabled and so on, women have an important role in 
the provision of social protection to the unproductive on the homestead. Male members have far 
more access to monetary earnings and their contribution includes the provision of goods, 
agricultural inputs and money. In case unproductive members need money for treatment or specific 
goods, male members will be responsible for this. 
Age is another important factor determining obligations and rights within the homestead. Children 
have few obligations in Swazi society, although they are expected to contribute to labour like cattle 
herding (young boys) or some light domestic activities (girls). When women and men are married 
they have reached complete man- and womanhood in Swazi society. In this stage both married man 
and women are mainly responsible for the welfare of both the younger and the elder generations. 
When they themselves become older they have and less to do with economie activities. Younger 
generations will take the major part in the economie pursuits of the homestead, and the older 
people have an increasing important position in the social sphere (Marwick 1966:68-71). 
The marital status of the homestead member influences the direction of the economie obligations. 
The umnarried female stay at her parents' homestead and her labour efforts and her earnings 
accrue to her parents. When she marries her productive efforts will accrue to her husbands' 
(fathers') homestead. A young unmarried male is in the same position as an umnarried woman. 
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His earnings should accrue for the largest parts to other members of the homestead, especially his 
father. When he is married earnings accrue to his own household, even though strong obligations 
to other homestead members continue, but these result from age or kin relations rather than from 
being married or not. 
Although Swazi make a distinction between homestead membership and kinship ties, in practice 
these relationships often coincide. But kinship in itself determines also obligations and rights 
homestead members have towards each other. Within the homestead the main kin relations are 
between children and parents, among siblings, and between wife and husband (affinal kin 
relations). The obligations and rights between children and parents change over a life-time. Parents 
are obliged to give to their children as long they are not able to produce their own means. As soon 
as the latter happens children begin to take care of their parents. The classificatory kinship system 
gives Swazi several "fathers" and "mothers" and consequently "sons" and "daughters", but the 
obligations to the biological parents and children remain strongest. Full brothers and sisters have 
strong obligations among each other, while the obligations among half siblings are less strict. 
In sum, when the conditions characterizing a solidarity group are applied to the homestead, at least 
theoretically the homestead is by and large well suited to function as such. lts size, composition 
and durability are such that it is able to provide (some) social protection to its members. Strong 
moral obligations to give and rights to receive exist within the homestead between its members. 
Which obligations and rights an individual homestead member has in general and at a more 
specific point in time depends on her or his social position in the homestead, which is a combinati-
on of someone's sex, age, marital status and place in the kinship system. Reciprocity underlies the 
transfers of means resulting from these obligations and rights. The economie conditions of the 
homestead will determine to what extent the homestead will have means available to redistribute. 
In the following sections I discuss the impact of migrant labour on the several conditions which 
make a homestead a solidarity group. 
3. Migrant Labour and the Size and Composition of the Homestead 
In this section and the sections hereafter the 83 homesteads in our sample are differentiated 
according to their stage in the development cycle. Reasons for this differentiation are twofold. In 
the first place the impact of migrant labour on the homestead may differ according to the actual 
stage in the "life-cycle" of the homestead. In the second place, differences found between home-
steads with migrant labourers and homesteads without them cannot be attributed anymore to 
demographic factors, because the size and composition of the homestead are kept constant for 
both migrant and non-migrant homesteads. In this way the influence of migrant labour can be 
better analyzed. Appendix A gives an explanation of the criteria used. Besides, because the issue of 
the dependenvy ratio is in essence a matter of composition it is also discussed in this section. 
The influence of migrant labour on the size and composition works out in several ways. One of the 
most obvious and evident influences on the size of the homestead is the decline of the number of 
resident members, as can be seen from Table 1. Group 1 indicates homesteads without migrant 
8 
labourers and Group 2 indicates homesteads with migrant labourers. 
Table 1: Average Size, Number of Migrants and Resident Size of Homesteads 
Stage in 
Development 
Cycle 
Group 1 Group 2 
Average 
Size 
Number of 
Migrants 
Resident 
Size 
Average 
Size 
Number of 
Migrants 
Resident 
Size 
Establishment 
Expansion 
Consolidation 
Fission 
Decline 
5.2 
8.0 
13.4 
8.1 
3.4 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5.2 
7.8 
12.8 
8.1 
3.4 
5 3 
8 3 
15.8 
9.0 
NA. 
1.0 
1.0 
1.8 
1.0 
NA. 
4.3 
7.3 
13.8 
8.0 
NA. 
Source: Survey 1990 
Table 1 shows that the average number of migrants in Group 2 is 1 for all homesteads except 
those in the stage of consolidation when a large part of homesteads has two members as migrant 
labourers. As homesteads in the consolidation stage also contain a majority of homesteads with two 
or more households (50 percent), this higher figure can be attributed to each household having its 
'own' migrant labourer. The average size of the homestead in terms of homestead residents is 
influenced, of course, in a negative way. In percent of total homestead members the effect on 
homesteads in the establishment stage is much higher than in the consolidation stage. The slight 
differences between resident size and total homestead size in Group 1 is explained by young 
absentee children who are temporary resident on other homesteads, because their own parents can 
not maintain them or because they live nearer to school then. Far more important than size, 
however, is the composition of the homestead and how this is influenced by having migrant 
labourers. In Table 2 some figures are given on this issue. 
A first issue to deal with is the number of producers versus non-producers. Although the number 
of producers in homesteads under Group 1 and under Group 2 are roughly the same, the number 
of resident producers are not: in Group 2 less people are available on the homestead to perform 
domestic and agricultural activities, and less productive people are present to take daily care of 
non-productive people. This can be seen when looking at the dependency ratio, which is defined as 
the total number of residents divided by the number of resident producers. While in homesteads 
without migrant labour the dependency ratio is at its highest at 3.0, this figure is 4.5 for home-
steads with migrant labour. 
Why is the migrant excluded as a producer when calculating this dependency ratio? One can argue 
that migrants send home remittances and in this way contribute to the welfare of those left behind. 
The dependency ratio including the migrant would not differ from homesteads without migrants. 
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Table 2: Number of Resident Producers, Dependency Ratio, Percentage of Homesteads 
without Male Resident Producers and Percentage of Female Headed Home-
steads 
Stage in 
Development 
Cycle 
Group 1 Group 2 
No. of 
res. pro-
ducers 
Depen-
dency 
Ratio 
% without 
male res. 
producers 
% female 
headed 
homesteads 
No. of 
res. pro-
ducers 
Depen-
dency 
Ratio 
% without 
male res. 
producers 
% female 
headed 
homesteads 
Establishment 
Expansion 
Consolidation 
Fission 
Decline 
1.8 
2.8 
4.7 
3.6 
1.6 
3.0 
2.9 
3.1 
2.4 
1.8 
16.7 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
45.5 
0.0 (16.7) 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 (60.0) 
0.0 (45.5) 
1.1 
2.1 
4.8 
2.6 
NA. 
4.0 
4.5 
3.1 
4.2 
NA. 
85.7 
40.0 
6.3 
NA. 
NA. 
71.4 
60.0 (30.0) 
25.0 (25.0) 
333 (33.3) 
NA. 
Source: Survey 1990 
To some extent this is true, but as was outlined in the previous section the daily care of the welfare 
of the non-productive homestead members is the task of women. This task entails mainly labour 
activities. As the migrants are always male, their absence does not affect the "traditional" work load 
of the productive women. What, however, happens is that when male productive members leave 
the homestead, their "traditional" tasks have to be taken over by women. Especially in the earlier 
stages of the development cycle the migration of male members leads to a complete absence of 
male productive members on the homestead (see Table 2 under " % without male resident 
producers"). In the establishment stage of the homestead 85.7 percent of the homesteads with 
migrant labour had no male resident producers. This means that tasks like ploughing the fields, 
herding the cattle, construction and repairing, harvesting and representing the homestead becomes 
the task of women in addition to their already heavy working load. The time available for taking 
care of the non-productive, in the first stages of the development cycle mainly children, will be less, 
and this may have negative consequences for their welfare. 
The above observations are narrowly related to the discussion around the so called "female headed 
households". The last column in Table 2 shows that in the establishment and expansion stage of the 
Group 2 homesteads 71.4 and 60.0 percent respectively are female headed homesteads because of 
labour migration. The figures in brackets indicate the additional percentage of female headed 
homesteads because of other reasons (mainly death of the male head). Although women are 
allowed to perform male activities in cases as described above ("necessity has no law"), they have 
great disadvantages when trying to obtain the means to perform these activities. Appeals for 
receiving more land from the chief, getting a tractor or oxen in time for ploughing, receiving help 
in construction activities, or help with legal disputes, or in hiring in labour, all have a chance to be 
less heard and honoured when asked by a woman. Thus, while doing male activities women are 
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also hampered in these activities because of lack of support and cooperation. 
As can be seen from Table 2 the argument mainly holds for relatively "young" homesteads, and 
given their size and composition, these are already vulnerable homesteads from a solidarity point of 
view. Migrant labour increases this vulnerability and has a negative influence on the welfare of the 
non-productive members, which will be mainly children. The relatively "older" homesteads have far 
more productive members left behind, who will be better able to cope with the extra work load as 
it can be spread over several persons. 
In Section 2 it was also argued that as a solidarity group the homestead is better off when 
productive activities are spread over activities which do not share the same risks. In other words, 
by diversifying the sources of income and produce the homesteads can prevent that all produce or 
income will be lost at the same time. By engaging in wage labour, part of the homestead produc-
tion is realized outside the homestead, which in itself means a spread of risks. It is often argued 
that wage-labour is a useful supplement to the homestead's agricultural produce but whether 
migrant labour has a positive or a negative effect on the composition of the homestead in this 
respect is open to discussion and should be analyzed by incorporating the other income or produce 
generating activities of the homestead. Table 3 presents the extent of diversification of income 
sources. 
Table 3: Homesteads and the Number of Income Sources (in % of homesteads in each 
stage) 
Stage in Homes-
tead Develop-
ment Cycle 
Group 1 Group 2 
Number of Income Sources Number of Income Sources 
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 
Establishment 
Expansion 
Consolidation 
Fission 
Decline 
0.0 
0.0 
11.1 
20.0 
36.4 
66.7 
50.0 
33.3 
30.0 
36.4 
33.3 
50.0 
55.6 
50.0 
18.2 
14.3 
10.0 
0.0 
0.0 
NA. 
42.9 
30.0 
0.0 
0.0 
NA. 
28.6 
40.0 
43.8 
100.0 
NA. 
14.3 
20.0 
56.2 
0.0 
NA. 
Source: Survey 1990 
For homesteads without migrant labourers three forms of producing can be distinguished: 
subsistence agriculture, commercial agriculture and other income-generating activities, often 
denoted as rural industry or small-scale enterprise activities. In Group 1 only relatively older 
homesteads have one source of income, being either subsistence agriculture or small scale activities 
(rural industry). Given the composition of these homesteads with relatively elderly people and few 
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productive members (see Table 2), available labour time is devoted to one activity only. However, 
most homesteads in Group 1 have two or three income sources. In most cases homesteads with 
two sources combine subsistence agriculture with rural industry. In this way food for the homestead 
is directly secured and is supplemented with money to buy other necessary goods. Commercial 
agriculture is either an extension of subsistence maize agriculture or involves the production of 
cotton. Homesteads with commercial agriculture have mostly three sources of income. Homesteads 
having more (productive) members available have more labour time that can be spent on income 
generating activities. On the other hand the larger size and the larger dependency ratios forces 
these homestead to raise an income as high as possible in order to feed all mouths. 
Looking at Group 2 reveals that a minority of these homesteads depends on wage-labour only as 
source of income. These homesteads are, of course, extremely vulnerable because unemployment 
would immediately lead to a complete lack of food or income. Many "young" homesteads have one 
other source of income besides wage-labour, which is in most cases subsistence agriculture. These 
homesteads are rarely involved in rural industry: the bulk of the money is secured by remittances 
(see Sections 5 and 6), and there is no time for other income generating activities. Homesteads 
with a combination of subsistence agriculture and wage-labour are mostly female headed homeste-
ads. Being often the only adult member of the homestead women are not able to go to the market 
to sell their produce. In this way they are forced to do subsistence agriculture, even if they would 
have time to be engaged in rural industry. Mainly homesteads in the consolidation stage have 
combined migrant labour with all other produce or income generating activities. For these 
homesteads migrant labour is not an alternative as in other cases, but is done besides other 
activities. Being engaged in all kind of activities these homesteads have a considerable spread of 
risks. 
It might be concluded that homesteads in Group 1 and in Group 2 have spread their activities to 
the same extent, except for some homesteads in the establishment and expansion stage in Group 2. 
Only the kind of activities over which productive efforts are spread differ and with this the kind of 
risks that are met (see Section 6). Income diversification itself is often seen as a form of coping 
with uncertainties. What can be concluded from this section is that "older" homesteads are better 
able to diversify income than "younger" homesteads. For the latter group the consequences of risks 
will be more severe than for other homesteads. 
4. Labour Migration and the Durability and Stability of the Homestead 
The durability of the social group is the third condition for a group to be a solidarity group. The 
members of the homestead must be certain the group will exist during their life time. It cannot be 
expected, however, that the homestead as a social group did not change during the last century. It 
has changed in fact, as an elaborate study of Allen (1973) showed. Has migrant labour anything to 
do with this, and how did and does it influence the changes taking place? This question can only be 
answered after a short survey of the various changes taking place. 
A general idea in development üterature is that in a society that develops from a traditional 
subsistence society towards a modern economy, extended families develop towards nuclear families, 
i.e., husband, wife and children (Murray 1981, United Nations 1986). I distinguish between the 
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process whereby multi-household homesteads are replaced by one-household homesteads and the 
process whereby three or more generation homesteads are replaced by two generation homesteads. 
Multi-household homesteads generate from polygyny as well as from married sons staying on their 
parents' homestead. The decrease of polygyny was already observed by Kuper (1947) and later by 
Allen (1973). The introduction of Christianity at the beginning of this century has slowly lead to a 
decline of polygyny. Also there has been a decreasing incidence of married sons staying with own 
households on the parental homestead. Kuper (1947:16) reported in this context that the home-
stead was decreasing from the old "multi-household" ideal because of "less need for defense, 
greater independence of married couples (particularly Christians) and limitations of land". What is 
also suggested in the literature (Allen 1973, Low 1986) is that married sons or brothers leave the 
homestead because migrant labour gives young men early opportunities to raise an income allowing 
them to establish their own homesteads. For homesteads in the establishment and expansion stage 
I found an average age of the head of 36 and 42 years, respectively. Given the average age of 55 
years of the heads of homesteads in the consolidation stage one might suggest that homesteads in 
earlier stages have broken away from their parent's homestead. A further indication for households 
breaking away is the finding that homesteads in the later stages of the development cycle (fission 
and decline) consist only of one household in which a widow or elderly couple live alone with only 
one (unmarried) son or daughter. Other children have left the homestead and established their 
own homestead. It should be noted, however, that migrant labour cannot be the only reason. 
Homesteads in Group 1 have no migrant labourers but also within this group "young" homesteads 
can be found that broke away from their parent's homestead. This might indicate that besides 
migrant labour providing early cash opportunities the other reasons mentioned above are equally 
important. Respondents in the survey frequently indicated that reasons for households to stay 
together on the same site is subject to rather individual decisions nowadays, and not on what 
society expect them to do. Migrant labour providing cash could well influence this decision, but I 
cannot support this proposition by data. 
As we saw, the stability of a solidarity group is also strengthened when it consists of three or more 
generations. A consequence of the earlier break-up of homesteads as described above is that 
"young" homesteads consisting of two generations are created and "older" homesteads with only one 
or two generations are left behind. Table 4 gives some data showing that in the consolidation and 
fission stage the majority of the homesteads has three or more generations, but in the earlier 
stages and in the decline stage two generations prevail as could be expected given the way 
homesteads are classified. Does it also mean that the homestead develops into some nuclear home-
steads? Again, given the way in which homesteads are classified, many nuclear homesteads can be 
found in the establishment stage and in the expansion stage, as can be seen in Table 4. From a 
durability point of view and considering the size and composition, these homesteads are less able to 
function as solidarity groups than homesteads in other stages. This is aggravated for homesteads in 
Group 2, as the husband is absent most of the year. Although migrants send money home, their 
unpaid labour efforts cannot be used when the wife cannot work because of contingencies. Help 
with activities has to be found outside the homestead, then. The durability of these nuclear 
homesteads can be highly questioned, and Murray (1981) has shown for Lesotho that these 
homesteads are very unstable. Social and economie contingencies can hardly be coped with and the 
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Table 4: Number of Generations on Homesteads and Percentage of Nuclear Home' 
steads (by stage in the development cycle and group) 
Stages in Home-
stead Develop-
ment Cycle 
Group 1 Group 2 
Number of 
Generations 
on Homestead 
% Nuclear 
Homesteads 
Number of 
Generations 
on Homestead 
% Nuclear 
Homesteads 
Establishment 2 : 100 % 100% 1: 1 4 % 
2 : 8 6 % 
8 6 % 
Expansion 2 : 8 0 % 
3 : 20 % 
4 0 % 2 : 70 % 
3 : 3 0 % 
4 0 % 
Consolidation 2 : 12 % 
3 : 78 % 
4 : 10 % 
0 % 2 : 18 % 
3 : 69 % 
4 : 1 3 % 
0 % 
Fission 2 : 2 0 % 
3 : 6 0 % 
4 : 2 0 % 
0 % 2 : 33 % 
3 : 6 7 % 
0 % 
Decline 1 : 3 6 % 
2 : 45 % 
3 : 19 % 
0 % N. A. N.A. 
Source: Survey 1990 
homestead will frequently break down. The wife and her children return to her parent's homestead 
or to her husband's parent's homestead. 
Murray (1981:102-4) warns, however, that nuclear families in developing countries often appear as 
nuclear, but this is neither a structural feature of these families nor it does mean social and 
economie independence. Firstly, the nuclear family is just a stage in the development cycle and it 
will develop into a more than two generation family. Figures above suggest this may also be the 
case in Swaziland. Secondly, nuclear families might appear isolated from their wider environment 
because of separate sites, but family gatherings take place for all sorts of reasons. The conclusion 
that separate sites of nuclear homesteads at the same time indicates social and economie 
independence, as is the case in industrialized countries, does not always hold. Also observations in 
Swaziland showed that young homesteads, when sited in the same community, have strong 
relationships with the parent homestead. Sometimes the social and economie interaction is so 
intensive that homesteads are seperated only geographically but no more than this. The above 
conclusions with respect to "nuclearization" on Swazi Nation Land should be treated with care. 
In sum, besides other factors, migrant labour affects the durabüity and stability of the homestead in 
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some ways. Migrant labour provides young homestead members with sufficiënt cash to establish 
their own homesteads. In this way households break away from homesteads sooner than in earlier 
times. This process also leads to the creation of a group of homesteads which are very "young" and 
consisting of a nuclear family only. As such these homesteads are relatively vulnerable and 
unstable, and less able to function as solidarity groups. When young households leave the 
homestead, the homestead left behind will also be less stable and durable. Homesteads in the 
decline stage also have just one or two generations, consisting of mainly elderly people then. The 
social protection of these people is also not guaranteed and becomes more uncertain. 
There is one other influence of migrant labour on the durability and stability of the homestead 
which I would like to mention. Among social scientists (including economists) it can frequently be 
heard that oscillating migration for the homesteads involved is a "way of life", of which the 
consequences are fully accepted and integrated in the social and economie organization of the 
homestead. However, the prolonged absence of one of the two adults in young families distorts 
family life to a large extent and often creates psychological problems for the migrant and those left 
behind. The stress on women increases and feelings of neglect and loneliness are more common 
than superficial surveys suggest. This, in turn, creates its own social problems like divorces, 
alcoholism and broken families. These problems undermine the homestead as solidarity group and 
with a lack of alternative mechanisms that provide social protection a group of people is created 
for whom life becomes highly uncertain and full of insecurity. 
5. Labour Migration and Principles of Distribution 
For the homestead to function as a solidarity group, the existence of moral principles which obüge 
homesteads members to give support to those who need it, is a necessary condition. As said in 
Section 2, the principle of reciprocity prevailing among generations and individual members within 
the homestead must ensure that homestead members support each other, also in times of need. 
Who has obligation to give to whom or who is entitled to receive from whom, and at what time, 
depends on someone's social position within the homestead as determined by someone's sex, age, 
marital status and place in the kinship system (relationship to the head of the homestead). 
Obviously, also feelings of love and affection strengthen the feeling of responsibility members have 
towards each other. 
The transfers made within the homestead for social security purposes are integral part of the 
general transfers of means within the homestead. The claims several homestead members have to 
the migrant labourer's means follow from the total pattern of this intra-homestead (re-)distribu-
tion. Because of his absence the kind of means the migrant has to offer is money. Returning with 
gifts just once a year, it is only in the form of regular remittances that the migrant labourer can 
contribute to the general welfare of the homestead, including social protection for the non-
productive members. As long as the migrant labourer fulfils his monetary obligations towards those 
left behind the reciprocity principle seems not be in danger and the homestead as solidarity group 
will continue to function quite well in this respect. What does reality shows us? 
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To start with, Table 5 presents some data on the remittances send home by the migrant labourer. 
It should be clear that only homesteads of Group 2 are included in the analysis in this section. 
Table 5: Percentage of Homesteads receiving Remittances, Share of Remittances in 
Total Disposable Income, Percentage of Total Income Migrant send Home, 
Remittances per Resident Member, by stage in the development cycle 
Stages in Ho- % of Homesteads Share (%) of Re- Remittances Remittances per 
mestead Deve- receiving Remit- mittances in Total as % of Mi- Resident Ho-
lopment Cycle tances Disposable Inco- grant's Total mestead Mem-
me Homestead ' Income ber (E')2) 
Establishment 100% 8 7 % 2 7 % 620 
Expansion 9 0 % 5 9 % 1 8 % 171 
Consolidation 87.5% 4 6 % 1 9 % 193 
Fission 100% NA. NA. NA. 
Decline NA. NA. NA. NA. 
1) The Total Disposable Income of the Homestead includes monetary earnings from commercial 
agriculture and rural industry, remittances, and the sales value of maize subsistence production. 
2) E' = Emalangeni (Sing. Lilangeni), which is equivalent to 0.36 US Dollar (June 1992) 
Source: Survey 1990 
The figures in Table 5 suggest that most migrants send money home. Few homesteads do not 
receive any significant remittances. Large differences exist, however, between homesteads in the 
establishment stage and homesteads in the expansion and consolidation stage. In the former case 
remittances make up 87 percent of the total homestead income, while in the later stages this figure 
declines. Reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, in the expansion and consolidation stage the 
homesteads have more income sources than subsistence agriculture and remittances only. Table 3 
already led to this conclusion. Consequently the share of remittances in the total disposable income 
is less. But secondly, as also can be seen in Table 5, the percentage of the wage income of the 
migrant that is received by the homestead declines.4 How to explain this phenomenon? An 
important explanation could be the social status of the migrant labourer himself and the responsi-
Note that the percentages given in Table 5 are very rough indications and are probably an 
underestimation of real figures. In the first place, not all homestead members were asked to report 
the remittances they receive from absentees and, secondly, a migrant labourer often has obligations 
towards people living outside his homestead as well (see also RusseU 1984). Thirdly, the migrant 
sends not only regular remittances but also money for particular purposes like buying a tractor, 
payment of school fees, and so on. In these cases the percentages in the second and third column 
would be higher than is suggested here. 
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bility this involves. Migrants belonging to homesteads in the establishment stage are at the same 
time head of the homestead. This implies that they have full responsibility for the welfare of all 
homestead members. Several other sources (Allen 1973, Murray 1978, Rosen-Prinz and Prinz) 
indicate that this responsibility is taken seriously by the migrant and expresses itself in the amount 
of remittances send home. In contrast, the heads of the homesteads in the expansion and 
consolidation stage are in many cases present on the homestead. Given their average age they have 
less chance to get a job as migrant labourer and the many daily affairs of his large homestead 
combined with social control forces him to stay at his homestead. The migrants of these home-
steads, then, are mostly young unmarried male which want to escape social and economie control 
of the head and the slow pace of life in the rural areas. These migrants have quite other motiv-
ations to migrate than the young head with strong feelings of responsibility (Rosen-Prinz and Prinz 
1978). Still the young migrants of Stage 2 and 3 homesteads have obligations towards homestead 
members, especially the parents. When a young unmarried male is the heir of the homestead he 
will probably follow up his father as head and send remittances home to ensure his position, but 
young unmarried male with no chance at all to have a future share in their father's possessions and 
wealth may be interested only in making as much money as possible to establish their own home-
stead. Sending money home only hampers this objective. Although the homestead in the consolida-
tion stage has relatively more members in wage labour (1.8, see Table 1), it may have less profit 
less from them for this reason. 
However, this behaviour of young unmarried migrants may have repercussions for their rights in 
the long term. The way in which oscillating labour migration operates causes migrants to return 
home after two or three years. This is also the case when they fall sick or are not able to finish 
their contract because of other reasons. For the migrant, the homestead is the base to which he 
will return and which will provide him social protection as far as possible. When the migrant 
neglects his obligations towards homestead members this behaviour might induce the homestead to 
be less willing to support the returning migrant. Further research, however, will be needed to verify 
whether or not such behaviour actually takes place. 
Another important observation in the context of this section is derived from a study from Russell 
(1984) on the redistribution of cash in Swazi society. A major conclusion of her study is that 
remittances are not just send "home" but to a range of specifie individuals to whom, because of 
specific relationships, migrants feel a particular obligation (Russell 1984:4). Kinship relations 
indicate the lines of responsibility. Therefore, a migrant will send money to the household in whose 
kitchen he eats, the kitchen of the woman feeding his children, the women he sleeps with, his 
mother and father (which may be several "fathers" and "mothers" because of the classificatory 
kinship system ) and grandparents. 
With a classificatory kinship system a given person has several people he or she calls 
"father", "mother", "sister", and so on. Intimacy with and responsibility for these classificatory kin 
are ordered and well ranked by well understood principles of the logic of lineage, affinity and birth 
order. In Swaziland, for example, a man's first father is his biological father, but if the biological 
father should fail or die, then father's eldest brother becomes father. "Father" has obligations to 
"child", and "child" has obligations to "father" (Russell 1984:11). 
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Another interesting observation of Russell is that the control over money in Swazi society is highly 
individualised and the spending is at the discretion of the earners. However, the exchanges of the 
earned money are still part of the broader pattern of reciprocity, which is highly generalised. 
Money remittances, therefore, circulate as gifts and it is still considered very ill-mannered to 
immediately reciprocate a gift. The introduction of money within the pattern of reciprocity creates 
its own problems because money as a gift threatens to transform generalised reciprocity into 
carping calculation (Russell 1984:2). The idea behind generalised reciprocity is that I can receive 
something from someone to whom I did never give. On the other hand, I give to people from 
whom I will never receive. This generalised reciprocity is the base of the redistribution of means 
for social security purposes, and ensures that people receive what they need. Because the 
possession of money is highly individualised, people give money with the idea that they will receive 
the same amount from the same person in return (or goods which are equivalent to the amount 
given). Money introduces calculation, therefore, and people will calculate their debts or credits 
towards each other. The result might be that people do not receive anymore what they need, with 
all consequences for their welfare. In this way migrant labour might undermine the principle of 
generalised reciprocity underlying the homestead's capacity to function as solidarity group. 
6. Labour Migration and the Economie position of the Homestead 
The last question referred to in this paper is the question to what extent labour migration 
influences the economie position of the homestead, i.e., its capacity to raise means which can be 
used for redistribution between productive and non-productive members. At first sight one could 
say that labour migration will provide homesteads with an extra income. But labour migration also 
means loss of productive power at home and this may negatively influence agricultural produce and 
rural industry. Table 6 is given to indicate average homestead disposable income and the different 
sources from which it is realized. 
A first conclusion from Table 6 can be that homesteads with migrant labour do not have a higher 
disposable income than homesteads without migrant labour. Only homesteads which are in the 
consolidation stage raise a higher income when they are involved in wage labour than homesteads 
without migrant labourers. This means in essence that migrant labour and the remittances it 
generates hardly influence the economie position of homesteads in terms of the level of disposable 
income. Homesteads without migrant labour receive a large share of their means by income 
generated in commercial agriculture (cotton or maize) and rural industry. Also subsistence 
production has a larger share in the disposable income than for homesteads with migrant labour. 
However, ending this section with this observation would not be satisfactory. Not only the level of 
the disposable income is important when assessing the economie position, but also the conditions 
under which production takes place and the intra-homestead distribution of income and wealth 
have to be included. How is labour migration related to these issues? 
Homesteads with migrant labourers and those without migrants realize their production in different 
ways and under different conditions. The two groups of homesteads are integrated differently in 
the wider economy. The latter homesteads realize their income by producing maize, cash crops and 
handicrafts. The former homesteads realize their income by selling their labour power on the 
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Table 6: Average Disposable Homestead Income*) and the Share of Income Generating 
Activities in the Disposable Homestead Income 
Group 1 Group 2 
Share of Activities in Income Share of Activities in Income 
Stage in Dev. 
Cycle 
Disp. 
Income 
Subs. 
Agt. 
Com. 
Agt. 
O.I.GA. Remitt. Disp. 
Income 
Subs. 
Agt. 
Comm. 
Agt. 
O.I.GA. Remitt. 
Establishment 
Expansion 
Consolidation 
Fission 
Decline 
3100 
4480 
4140 
2370 
1190 
0.07 
0.25 
0.18 
0.10 
0.17 
0.21 
0.21 
0.20 
0.23 
0.10 
0.72 
0.54 
0.51 
0.49 
0.57 
0.00 
0.00 
0.11 
0.18 
0.16 
2760 
2750 
4900 
4480 
NA. 
0.08 
0.10 
0.08 
NA. 
NA. 
0.02 
0.06 
0.17 
NA. 
NA. 
0.03 
0.15 
0.29 
NA. 
NA. 
0.87 
0.59 
0.46 
NA. 
NA. 
*) Homestead Disposable Income = Sales Value of Maize Subsistence Production + Income from 
Commercial Agricultural + Income from Other Income Generating Activities (O.I.GA.) + 
Remittances (in E.) 
Source: Survey 1990 
labour market. Homesteads without migrant labour depend for part of their activities on the input 
and output markets and part on the natural environment, and are subject to fluctuations in these 
markets and to fluctuations in ecological and natural conditions. Homestead with migrant labour 
are dependent on the fluctuating and highly unstable labour market. In this way, as also said in 
Section 3, the economie position of the homesteads with migrant labour is exposed to other risks 
than that of homesteads without migrant labourers. For the former type, with their high depend-
ence on income from wage-labour only, unemployment and decline in wages are likely to have 
large impacts on their welfare. This stands in contrast with homesteads without migrant labour, of 
which produce and income are better spread over several activities and hence are subject to 
different risks. In sum, as migrant labour leads to homesteads involved in other markets than 
homesteads without migrant labour, and therefore face different conditions, their economie 
position is threatened by different risks. 
Narrowly related to the above issue is that homesteads without migrant labour have all their 
productive activities at home, which means that the local institutional setting will have large 
influences on their economie position. The extent to which land is available and distributed among 
homesteads, agricultural and infrastructural projects are initiated, and the homestead can have 
political influence has large impacts on the economie position. Homesteads with migrant labour are 
for their economie position less dependent on the local institutional and political setting and are, 
therefore, less vulnerable to phenomena like, for example, land scarcity and unequal distnbution 
of land. 
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The intra-homestead distribution of the disposable income also differs between the two sets of 
homesteads. Labour migration to South Africa is male dominated. This means that the wages 
earned accrue in first instance to male homestead members. Rural industry activities like beer 
brewing, making mats and baskets, knitwork, tailoring, and so on, are female dominated. Income 
from these activities will fall upon women. Income from agricultural activities accrues to both men 
and women. As explained in Section 2 women keep their own maize production in store. Men keep 
the production from the "grandmother's field" and receive the money when maize or cotton is sold. 
Women receive money when they sell vegetables from their garden. It was stated that the daily 
care of the non-productive homestead members is a task of women. It can be assumed, then, that 
of the income which accrues to women a larger part will be spent on the general welfare of the 
homestead, including the care of non-productive members, while income earned by men is to a 
lesser extent spent on the general welfare of the homestead. Studies (SSRU 1990, Russell 1984) on 
this issue confirm this assumption. 
Unless remittances are sent to women, the economie position of the homesteads without migrant 
labour can be more positively valued from a social security point of view than the economie 
position of homesteads with migrant labour, because intra-homestead distribution of income and 
produce is more directed towards the women. In case remittances are sent to women it can be 
expected that these will be spent largely on the general welfare of the homestead. Main difference 
with homesteads without migrant labour remains, however, that in the former case women have 
more control over monetary earnings because they earn the money with their own activities. In this 
way women also have more control over the use of this money. 
Last issue in this section is whether there is any relationship between the wealth of homesteads and 
migrant labour. Because land cannot be privately owned, private savings are the main form of 
wealth. In situations of low real interest rates savings can be best invested in "real estate", which is 
mainly cattle in the Swazi case. Table 7 presents some figures on cattle ownership. 
Table 7 shows that differences with respect to cattle ownership do exist between homesteads with 
and without migrant labour. However, it is difficult to say whether this can be attributed to migrant 
labour or not. As in many African societies cattle is only partly obtained from the market. As cattle 
is, besides money, the main item in which the bride price is paid, homesteads obtain cattle also in 
other ways. Partly for this reason homesteads in the consolidation stage have more cattle than in 
other stages: daughters are getting married and homesteads receive cattle when the daughter 
leaves. Moreover, cattle is accumulated, through breeding and through the market, in order to pay 
the bride price when sons of the homesteads get married. All this might explain differences 
between stages in the development cycle, but not between migrant and non-migrant homesteads. 
Tentatively three possible explanations for this finding can be put forward. Firstly, homesteads with 
migrant labourers have more money available than homesteads without. This means that home-
steads with migrant labour can more easily acquire cattle from the market and are not solely 
dependent on non-market transfers of cattle (payments of bride price mainly). Secondly, related to 
the issue of the distribution of income and produce, in homesteads with migrant labour more 
income accrues to men than in homesteads without migrants. As the main responsibility of the man 
(at least the head) is to ensure the long-term survival of the homestead he will invest his savings in 
cattle to reach this objective. In this way he also guarantees some form of social protection for the 
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Table 7: Percentage of Homesteads owning Cattle and Average Number of Cattle 
owned (by stage in the development cycle) 
Group 1 Group 2 
Stage in Devel-
opment Cycle 
% Homesteads 
owning cattle 
Average Num-
ber of Cattle 
% Homesteads 
owning Cattle 
Average Num-
ber of Cattle 
Establishment 
Expansion 
Consolidation 
Fission 
Decline 
67.7 
50.0 
75.0 
40.0 
54.5 
7.8 
6.4 
16.8 
19.0 
6.0 
100.0 
90.0 
93.7 
100.0 
NA. 
9.3 
10.4 
16.4 
3.5 
NA. 
Source: Survey 1990 
homestead in case he will get unemployed. Women are responsible for short-term economie 
decisions related to daily survival. They will spend their money on goods and items necessary for 
daily survival (see also Raatgever 1988). Homesteads without migrant labour do have a more equal 
distribution of means between men and women, but at the same time less male savings are 
available to invest in cattle. In homesteads with migrant labour this is the other way round. A third 
reason for the difference found might be that men who migrate are usually young men who still 
have to pay their marriage cattle or part of it, while the men staying at home are more settled and 
already have fulfilled their bride price payments. With this explanation differences in cattle 
ownership are explained by the life cycle of individual members rather than by the homestead 
development cycle. 
7. Conclusions 
For the majority of the population of Swaziland, the homestead is the most important social and 
economie unit in Swazi society. Providing social protection to its members is one its functions. 
Given the various conditions that a solidarity group has to satisfy, we find that the homestead is 
indeed theoretically capable of performing its protective function. In this paper the central question 
was how labour migration of homestead members to South Africa affects the homestead as 
solidarity group. To answer this question I tried to indicate relationships between migrant labour 
and the several conditions that make a social group to function as a solidarity group. 
The influence of migrant labour on the size of the homestead is evident, but has no major 
consequences as long as remittances are sent home. Migrant labour influences the composition of 
the homestead in several ways. The resident producers, which are mainly women, have to perform 
more tasks and indirectly this will influence the daily care of the non-productive members. 
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Moreover, labour migration gives rise to "female-headed households", which have a difficult 
position in Swazi social relations. Labour migration does, however, diversify the income sources of 
the homestead and the covariance of risks is less than for homesteads with home-based production. 
In this way migrants may make the homestead less vulnerable. 
The durability and stability of homesteads are also influenced by migrant labour. Labour migration 
gives opportunities for young men to raise own income and establish their own homestead. They 
have an opportunity to break away from the parental homestead. This breaking-up causes a 
"nuclearization" of homesteads. Although the observation that nuclear homesteads exist should be 
treated with care, these homesteads must be considered hardly capable to function as solidarity 
group. The process of breaking-up also gives rise to homesteads containing two generations or less. 
Due to this fact homesteads are less capable to function as solidarity groups. Labour migration 
might also threaten the durability and stability of a homestead by creating other social problems 
like alcoholism, divorces, and so on. 
With respect to the principle of "normative insurance" within homesteads, implying generalised 
reciprocity, labour migration has its impact by introducing money in the sphere of redistribution. In 
Swazi society money is individually owned and its use is at the discretion of those who have it. 
Although money is transferred by the principle of reciprocity, this reciprocity becomes less 
generalised, thus threatening the main principle underlying intra-homestead solidarity. 
The influence of migrant labour on the economie position of the homestead is mixed. It seems to 
provide homesteads with greater wealth, but it does not provide substantially more income to the 
homestead compared with homesteads without migrant labour. It must be said that the remittances 
might be higher than suggested in this paper because of non-monetary contributions. If this is the 
case, the homesteads with migrant labour will probably be provided with more means than those 
without. Intra-homestead distribution of income between sexes seems to become more male biased 
in homesteads engaged in migrant labour. This might lead to a situation in which less means 
become available for the general welfare of the homestead. 
In sum, the impact of labour migration on the homestead as solidarity group is mixed, but I think 
it can be concluded that on balance it is negative. However, the extent to which labour migration 
influences individual homesteads as solidarity groups depends on the stage of the homestead in the 
development cycle. Homesteads in the consolidation stage will feel less negative consequences 
when one of its members migrates and may even profit from it, while "younger" homesteads 
become very vulnerable in the sense of being less able to deal with social and economie contin-
gencies. 
22 
References 
Allen, CJ . (1973), Dimensions of Swazi Households in Rural and Urban Areas, Massachusetts: 
University of Massachusetts (unpublished PhD-thesis) 
Booth, A.R. (1986), "Homestead, State and Migrant Labour in Colonial Swaziland", in: J. Daniel 
and M.F. Stephen (eds.), Historical Perspectives on the Political Economy of 
Swaziland; selected articles, Kwaluseni: Social Science Research Unit / Univer-
sity of Swaziland 
Booth, A.R. (1988), "Capitalism and the Competition for Swazi Labour, 1945-1960", in: H J . 
Tieleman (ed.), Scènes of Change: Visions on Developments in Swaziland, 
Research Reports No33/1988, Leiden: African Studies Centre 
Central Statistical Office (1986), Report on the 1986 Swaziland Population Census, Vol.1, Statistical 
Tables, Mbabane: Central Statistical Office 
Elkan, W. (1978), "Labour Migration from Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland", in African Perspecti 
ves, 1978/1, pp.145-157 
Fortes, M. (1970), Time and Social Structure and Other Essays, London: Athlone Press 
Fransman, M. (1982), "Labour, Capital and the State in Swaziland, 1962-1977", South African 
Labour Bulletin, Vol.7, No.2, pp. 
Freiburg-Strauss, J. and D. Jung (1988), "Social Security in the Peasant Society of Boyaca", in: F. 
von Benda-Beckmann et al.(eds.), Between Kinship and the State; Social 
Security and Law in Developing Countries, Dordrecht: Foris Publications 
Holleman, HJ . (ed.) (1964), Experiment in Swaziland, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Hughes, AJ.B. (1972), Land Tenure, Land Rights and Land Communities on Swazi Nation Land in 
Swaziland, Durban: University of Natal 
Kowet, D.K. (1978), Land, Labour Migration and Politics in Southern Africa: Botswana, Lesotho 
and Swaziland, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 
Kuper, H. (1947), An African Aristocracy: Rank among the Swazi, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Kuper, H. (1963), 77ie Swazi; A South African Kingdom, New York/London: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston Inc. 
23 
Levin, R.M. (1985), Hegemony or Crisis: Swazi royal Power in Transition, Liverpool: University of 
Liverpool 
Low, A.R.C. (1986), Agricultural Devehpment in Southern Africa; Farm-Households Economics and 
the Food Crisis, London: James Currey 
Marwick, BA. (1966), The Swazi: An Ethnographic Account of the Swaziland Protectorate, London: 
Frank Gass & Co 
Murray, C. (1978), "Migration, Differentiation and the Development Cycle in Lesotho", African 
Perspectives, 1978/1, pp. 127-144 
Murray, C. (1981), Families Divided; Impact of Migrant Labour in Lesotho, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Neocosmos, M. (1987) (ed.), Social Relations in Rural Swaziland, Kwaluseni: Social Science 
Research Unit / University of Swaziland 
Ngubane, H. (1983), 'The Swazi Homestead", in: F. de Vletter (1983) (ed.), The Swazi Rural 
Homestead, Kwaluseni: Social Science Research Unit 
Partsch, M. (1983), Prinzipien und Formen sozialer Sicherung in nicht-industriellen Gesellschaften, 
Sozialpolitische Schriften, Heft 48, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 
Raatgever, R. (1988), De Verwantschappelijke Economie; Essays in de Historisch-Materialistische 
Antropologie, Brugge: Walleyndruk NV 
Rosen-Prinz, B.D. and FA. Prinz (1978), Migrant Labour and Rural Homesteads: An Investigation 
into the Sociological Dimensions of the Migrant Labour System in Swaziland, 
World Employment Programme Working Paper, Geneva: International Labour 
Organisation 
Russell, M. (1983), Boundaries and Structures in the Swaziland Homestead, University of Swaziland 
Kwaluseni: Social Science Research Unit 
Russell, M. (1984), Beyond Remittances: the Redistribution of Cash in Swazi Society, Research 
Paper No.12, Kwaluseni: Social Science Research Unit / University of Swazi-
land 
Russell, M. (1988), "A landed Proletariat? Coming to terms with a Contradiction in Terms", in: 
H J . Tieleman (ed.), Scènes of Change: Visions on Developments in Swaziland, 
Research Reports No.33/1988, Leiden: African Studies Centre 
24 
Sibisi, H. (1979), Homestead Organization, Paper No.II, Mbabane: Ministry of Agnculture and 
Cooperatives 
SSRU (Social Science Research Unit) (1990), Children and Women in Swaziland, Report submitted 
to UNICEF, Kwaluseni: Social Science Research Unit/University of Swaziland 
United Nations (1986), The Role of the Family in the Development Process, Department of 
International Economie and Social Affairs, New York: United Nations 
Vletter, F. de (1982), "Labour Migration in Swaziland: recent Trends and Implications", in: F_A.O. 
(ed.), Labour Migration and Agricultural Development in Southern Africa, Rome: 
F.A.O. 
Vletter, F. de (1983) (ed.), The Swazi Rural Homestead, Kwaluseni: Social Science Research Unit 
/ University of Swaziland 
Vletter, F. de (1985), "Recent Trends and Prospects of Black Migration to South Africa", Journal of 
Modem African Studies, Vol.23, No.4 
Whiteside, A.W. (1992), Labour Migration in Southern Africa to the Year 2000 and beyond, 
(unpublished paper), Durban: Economie Research Unit / University of Natal 
25 
Appendix A: Criteria used for Classification of Homesteads 
For the classification of homesteads according to their stage in the development cycle, the criteria 
outlined in Table A were used. 
Table A: Criteria used to classify homesteads according to their place in the homestead 
development cycle 
Criteria / 
Homestead Fre-
quency 
Homestead Development Cycle 
Stage 1 
Establishment 
Stage 2 
Expansion 
Stage 3 
Consolidation 
Stage 4 
Fission 
Stage 5 
Decline 
Homestead Size 
Age of Head 
Chiidren 
< 15 years 
Child / Population 
Ratio 
(a) 1 - 3a 
(b) 1 - 6b 
(a) < 40a 
(b) < 50b 
(a) 0 
(b) > 0 
7 - 10 
(a) < 50a 
(b) < 55b 
(a) 0.24 
(b) 0.49 
> 10 7 - 10 
Other 
than 
Stage 2 
1 -6 
Other 
than 
Stage 1 
Frequency own 
sample 
% of Total 
13 
15.6 
20 
24.1 
25 
30.1 
13 
15.6 
12 
14.6 
Sample Low 12.0 22.1 26.5 20.3 19.1 
Sources: Adapted from Low (1986:83), Table 7.17 
Survey 1990 
In his study Low (1986) uses a five stage typology formulated by Fortes (1970) for the homestead 
development cycle: establishment, expansion, consolidation, fission and decline. The criteria used to 
distinguish the stages are homestead size, homestead composition and the so-called con-
sumers/workers ratio. In Table A these criteria are represented by homestead size, the age of the 
head and the children/population ratio respectively. Homesteads are in the establishment stage (a) 
when the homestead size is between 1 and 3, the age of the head is below 40 years and no chiidren 
are on the homestead, or else (b) when its size is between 1 and 6 members, the age of the head is 
below 50 years and any chiidren under 16 years old are present. Other homesteads with 1 till 6 
members are in the decline stage when the above conditions are not fulfilled. Homesteads are in 
the stage of expansion when (a) the size ranges from 7 till 10 persons, the age of the head is below 
50 years and the children/population ratio is greater than 0.24, or else (b) when the age of the 
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head is below 55 years and the children/population ratio is greater than 0.49. All other homesteads 
between 7 and 10 members are supposed to be in the fission stage. The consohdation stage 
contains homesteads with a size that exceeds 10 persons. 
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